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Evaluating the Vulnerability of Communities in
Social Networks by Gravity Model
Tao Wen
Abstract—With the development of network science, the var-
ious properties of complex networks have recently received
extensive attention. Among these properties, the vulnerability
of the communities (VoCs) is particularly important. In the
conventional research, only parts of structural features of the
community rather than multiple aspects are considered in the
evaluating model. However, in reality, the impact on the VoC
is multifaceted, not only its own structure property, but also
the influence of other communities. In order to better model
the influence between communities, so as to evaluate the VoCs
in the social network, a gravity-based community vulnerability
evaluation model is proposed in this paper. In this proposed
model, three different aspects of the factor are considered, i.e.
the number of edges inside the community, the number of edges
connected neighboring communities, and the gravity index (GI)
of each community, which correspond to the interior information,
small scale interaction relationship, and large scale interaction
relationship of communities. By means of the Jensen-Shannon
divergence (JSD) and log-sigmoid transition (LST) function, the
abstract distance (AD) between each pair of communities can
be calculated to construct the community network (CN). With
the usage of gravity model, the GI of each community which
describes the large scale interaction relationship can be obtained.
Eventually, the community vulnerability degree and order can
be calculated by this proposed model, and the sensitivity of
weighting parameters is analyzed by Sobol’ indices. In particular,
this proposed method can degenerate to the classical method
with the setting of weighting parameters. The effectiveness and
reasonability of this proposed model are demonstrated by several
real world complex networks.
Index Terms—Complex network, Community vulnerability,
Gravity model, Jensen-Shannon divergence, Log-sigmoid tran-
sition.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of the Internet, socialization has
become an indispensable part of people’s daily life, such as
sharing news on Twitter, chatting with friends via Telegram,
and so on [1]. In order to quantify people’s performance in
social, social networks are immediately proposed to describe
individuals’ relationships. In social networks, each individual
has a closely related group, and it is called community. The
community structure is widespread in the network, and it has
become a popular topic in the field of network science [2]–[4].
In general, the research in the network community is mainly
divided into two fundamental issues. The first issue is how
to detect the community structure in the network effectively
and accurately, that is, how to divide the network into high-
density groups with different sizes. Numerous algorithms have
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been developed to address this problem in different types
of networks. More specifically, Newman [5] developed a
series of models to detect community structure which is the
basis of this field. Liu et al. [6] proposed a multi-objective
evolutionary algorithm to detect community structure in so-
cial networks which can deal with the positive and negative
links in overlapping communities. Fortunato [7] summarized
most interdisciplinary methods to detect community structure
from the definition of the main elements, and applied these
algorithms in lots of real world networks. There are still
lots of detection algorithms based on machine learning, such
as Z-network model [8], latent space graph regularization
[9], and particle swarm optimization [10]. The other issue is
how to quantitatively describe the common properties in each
community, because these community properties will affect
the judgment of the whole network structure. For example,
the similarly of each pair of nodes has been measured to
find the same group across multi-layer social network [11]–
[13]. The subset of high-propagation capabilities individuals
has been identified to reduce the scale of disaster and rumour
transmission [14]–[16]. The resilience of community has been
quantified to describe how the initial set of community struc-
tures survived and returned after the disruption [17]–[19]. The
key opinion leaders have been identified to draw specific types
of audiences, which can form a long-term relationship and
govern the success or failure of social activities [20]–[22].
Among these properties of community, the vulnerability
of community has gradually attracted researchers’ attention,
because this property can visualize the important components
of social networks. By evaluating the vulnerability of each
community, resources of the network can be prioritized which
can reduce the damage for the network, and the performance
of each component in networks can be well protected or
improved. Thus, lots of researches have been focused on eval-
uating community vulnerability and corresponding protecting
methods [23]–[25]. Recently, Che et al. [26] gave a nondi-
mensionalized scoring standard based on Analytic Hierarchy
Process and Artificial Neural Network to assess the vulnera-
bility of urban power grid, which is in the field of machine
learning. Then, Rocco et al. [27] developed a qualitative metric
to evaluate the community vulnerability which focuses on
the connectivity between every two connected communities.
This qualitative metric provides some insight into the relative
strength of each community, and has been used in several real
world complex networks. Thus, connectivity has been shown
to be an important consideration in individuals’ resistance to
disasters in the network, i.e. the vulnerability of community.
Based on this qualitative metric, Wei et al. [28] proposed a
generalized model which considers both the outer connectivity
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of a community and its inner structure. This model combines
5 factors (3 internal factors and 2 external factors) into 1
comprehensive metric to evaluate the community vulnerability
which is suitable not only for unweighted networks but also
for weighted networks.
In order to better describe the relationship between commu-
nities, so as to evaluate the community vulnerability, a novel
method which is called gravity-based community vulnerability
evaluation (GBCVE) model is developed in this paper, which
involves from the community detection to the final vulnerabil-
ity evaluating and ranking of each community. Specifically, the
community structure is detected by Newman’s modularity [29]
from the social network. The basic information can be obtained
from the structure directly, which contains the number of edges
inside the community (EIC) and the number of edges outside
the community (EOC). Then, the abstract distance (AD) which
describes the difference between every two communities is ob-
tained by Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) and log-sigmoid
transition (LST) technique. Thus, the community network
(CN) which is a fully-connected undirected network can be
constructed by the AD. After that, the gravity index (GI)
of each community is calculated based on the gravity model
from the CN. This proposed model would combine these three
factors (EIC, EOC, GI) with weighting parameters, which can
be used in different situations. This proposed method would
degenerate to the classical method under special weighting
parameter setting. The EIC, EOC, and GI correspond to
different aspects of consideration information, i.e. the interior
information of each community, the small scale interaction
relationship, and large scale interaction relationship respec-
tively. Eventually, the vulnerability of each community can be
calculated by this proposed model, and the vulnerability order
can be obtained by fuzzy ranking algorithm, which is more
reasonable to describe their vulnerability relationship between
different communities. In addition, the sensitivity of these
weighting parameters is analyzed by Sobol’ indices. After two
real world complex networks evaluation, the reasonability and
effectiveness of this proposed model can be demonstrated. The
results show the superiority of this proposed method, and it is
an effective model to measure the property of communities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The definition
of this problem is given in Section II. Section III develops this
community vulnerability evaluation model in detail, which is
divided into five parts. The experimental evaluations which
contain two real world complex networks are given in Section
IV, and the results show the effectiveness and reasonability
of this proposed model. The conclusions and future work are
discussed in Section V.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
For a given social network G(N,E), it is composed of
multiple social individuals and the relationships (links) be-
tween individuals. Each individual in the network has different
connection strengths, so the network can be divided into
several communities. One example social network with 9
individuals and 14 links is shown in Fig. 1, and this social
network can be divided into 3 communities (c1, c2, and c3)
by Newman’s modularity method [29]. The purpose of this
paper is to evaluate the vulnerability of communities (VoCs) by
considering multiple structure properties of each community,
and get the vulnerability order in social networks which can
guide the establishment of social networks.
Community 1Community 2
Community 3
1 2
8
7
9
6
3
4 5
Fig. 1. The example social network with 9 nodes.
According to the above introduction and definition, the
problem is defined as follows:
Input: The input information is the structure of social
network G(N,E), where N is the set of individuals, and E is
the set of relationships between individuals. The topological
relationship of the social network is given by the adjacency
matrix A, and the element aij in A indicates whether there is
a connection between individual i and individual j.
Output: When the social network is divided in several com-
munities, this proposed method can evaluate the vulnerability
of community ci (V oCi), and give the vulnerability order in
the network.
III. METHODOLOGY
The community structure of social networks is key to be
considered. In the real world, every individual has their own
community, and the VoCs also affects individuals’ activities.
Thus, a novel method called gravity-based community vul-
nerability evaluation (GBCVE) model is proposed in this
paper to consider: 1) the property of community itself; 2) the
relationships between the chosen community and other com-
munities (large scale and small scale). Adequate consideration
of community information makes GBCVE more reasonable
and effective to obtain the vulnerability results.
For a given social network G(N,V ), the VoCs can be
obtained by the following steps:
1) Divide the network into several communities.
The whole network G can be divided into multiple non-
intersecting communities, and each individual belongs to
only one community ci.
2) Obtain the basic information of each community.
With the obtained community structure, the basic infor-
mation of community can be obtained, which contains
the number of edges inside the community (EIC), and the
number of edges outside the community (EOC).
3) Construct community network by the abstract distance.
According to the structure of communities, the Jensen-
Shannon divergence (JSD) between communities can be
obtained by Eq. (7) to describe the difference between
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communities, then, the JSD can be transformed to abstract
distance (AD) to construct community network (CN) by
log-sigmoid transition (LST) function in Eq. (9)
4) Build the large scale relationship between different
communities.
Given the computed AD between communities, the large
scale relationship (gravity index, GI) between each pair of
communities can be built by Eq. (10) based on the gravity
model (GM).
5) Compute the vulnerability of each community.
With the obtained three factors of each community (EIC,
EOC, and GI), the VoC can be calculated based on the
comprehensive consideration of the property of the com-
munity.
6) Obtain the fuzzy ranking of community vulnerability.
After the VoC calculation process, the fuzzy ranking order
of community vulnerability can be obtained.
The framework of this proposed GBCVE model is shown
in Fig. 2.
Network Structure
G(N, V)
Community 
vulnerability degree
Community 
vulnerability order
Community    1
1c Community    12c Community    1Cc
Gravity Index  1
Number of edges 
outside community   1
Number of edges 
inside community   1
Abstract distance  1
Jensen-Shannon 
Divergence
Gravity Model
Newman Modularity
Vulnerability 
Evaluating
Fuzzy Ranking
Part I: Community Detection
Part II: Basic Property Acquisition Part III: Community Relationship Reasoning
Part IV: Vulnerability Evaluation 
and Ranking
Log-sigmoid 
Transition Function
Fig. 2. The framework of this proposed GBCVE model.
In order to introduce the model in detail, the rest of this
section is divided into five main subsections from Section
III-A to III-E. Specifically, Section III-A introduces how to
get the community structure from the social network, which
corresponds Step 1. Section III-B obtains the basic information
of each community, which shows Step 2. The community rela-
tionship can be measured by divergence, transition technique,
and gravity model in Section III-C, which contains Step 3 and
Step 4. The vulnerability evaluating and ranking process are
given in Section III-D, corresponding to Step 5 and Step 6.
Eventually, the sensitivity of this proposed model is analyzed
in Section III-E.
A. Part I: Communities Detection
A social network can be denoted as G(N,E), where N =
{1, 2, · · · , |N |} and V = {1, 2, · · · , |V |} are the set of nodes
and edges respectively, |N | and |V | are the whole number of
nodes and edges respectively. The topological relationship in
the network is represented by the adjacency matrix A, whose
size is |N | × |N |. The element aij shows whether there is
a edge between node i and node j, i.e. aij = 1 means the
existence of edges and vice versa.
Definition III.1. The modularity of network with |C| commu-
nities is denoted as Q [29], and is defined below:
Q =
|C|∑
ck=1
 |Eck ||E| −

∑
i∈Nck
di
2 |E|

2
 (1)
where ck is the chosen community, |C| and |E| is the total
number of communities and edges in the network respectively,
|Eck | is the number of edges inside the community ck, Nck is
the set of nodes in community ck, and di is the degree of node
i. The degree of node means the number of edges connected
with chosen node.
The value of Q can be used as a good indicator to mea-
sure the existence of the community structure, and different
values of Q show whether the existing community division is
reasonable.
• Q = 0 represents all nodes (i.e. |N | nodes) are divided
into one single community, and there will be no commu-
nity structure in the social network.
• Q ∈ (0, 1) means the existence of community structure,
and different values of Q indicate the strength of the
community structure.
• Q = 1 indicates the existing community structure is very
strong.
In addition, Girvan and Newman [30] gave the suggestion
that the value of Q between 0.2 and 0.7 indicates a good
community structure in the social network. The algorithm to
detect the community structure is to find the change of Q
value, and the detail steps are shown below:
Step 1: Treat every point in the network as a separate com-
munity, i.e. there is |N | communities at the beginning,
and obtain Q0 in this situation.
Step 2: Combine any two communities into a community in
turn, and calculate Qt(i, j) of the integrated commu-
nity structure (combined community i and j in tth
integration).
Step 3: Obtain the modularity change ∆Qt(i, j) = Qt(i, j)−
Qt−1 before and after the integration from the com-
munity structure.
Step 4: Find the maximum value of ∆Qt in the tth integration,
i.e. ∆Qt = max
i,j
∆Qt(i, j), and this structure with
modularity Qt is chosen as the integration method.
Step 5: Repeat Step 2 to Step 4 until ∆Qt < 0.
Example III.1. The social network in Fig. 1 is used as
an example to illustrate the community detection algorithm.
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The integration process and the change of Q is shown in
Table I. The community structure in each time is the existing
community division, and these communities shown in bold
form will integrate at next time. Qt is calculated by the
community structure at this time. Take time at 6 as an example,
the process to obtain Qt is:
Q6 =
(
1
14
−
(
4
28
)2)
+
(
3
14
−
(
8
28
)2)
+
(
6
14
−
(
16
28
)2)
= 0.2857
and the modularity change ∆Q6 = Q6 − Q5 = 0.2857 −
0.2117 = 0.0740. When the modularity change ∆Qt < 0, the
integration process will stop, and the final community structure
will appear. Thus, the social network is finally divided into
three communities, and they are {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8, 9}
respectively.
TABLE I
THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND THE CHANGE OF Q.
Times t Communities structure Qt ∆Qt
0 {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9} -0.1224 –
1 {1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9} -0.0612 0.0612
2 {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9} -0.0051 0.0561
3 {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6}, {7}, {8}, {9} 0.0995 0.1046
4 {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6}, {7, 8}, {9} 0.1403 0.0408
5 {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6}, {7, 8, 9} 0.2117 0.0714
6 {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8, 9} 0.2857 0.0740
7 {1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} 0.2653 -0.0204
B. Part II: Basic Property Acquisition
After the community structure of social network is obtained,
the basic information of each community can be obtained
to describe their properties. The number of edges inside
the community (EIC) and the number of edges outside the
community (EOC) are two significant properties in different
aspects to describe community vulnerability.
Definition III.2. The EIC for community ci is obtained as
below:
ηi =
∑
j,k∈ci
ajk (2)
where ajk represents whether there is an edge between node j
and node k, and node j, k belong to community ci. This means
the edge is completely inside the community, not connected to
the outside, indicating the connectivity within the community.
Thus, EIC demonstrates the interior information of community.
Definition III.3. The EOC for community ci is obtained as
below:
σi =
∑
j∈ci,k/∈ci
ajk (3)
which is different with the EIC, the EOC describes the acces-
sibility between the chosen community and other communities
(node j belongs to community ci, but node k belongs to
other communities except community ci). Large σi means this
community ci is convenient to communicate with other com-
munities. Thus, EOC demonstrates the small scale interaction
relationship of community.
Example III.2. For the social network in Fig. 1, it has been
divided into three communities in Example III.1. ηi and σi of
these three communities can be obtained by the community
structure, and they are η = [1, 3, 6] and σ = [2, 2, 4]
respectively.
C. Part III: Large Scale Community Relationship Reasoning
After obtaining the information within the community
(EIC) and with neighboring societies (EOC), the relation-
ship between each pair of communities, i.e. the large scale
information, is also significant to evaluate each community
vulnerability. To measure the large scale relationship, JSD,
LST, and GM are applied in this section. The details are shown
below:
1) Community Abstract Distance: The distance between
communities can be regarded as the physical distance, i.e. the
sum of the length of the edges in the network, but it only
reflects the distance between communities in space. In this
section, community properties are considered to calculate the
abstract distance (AD) between communities.
Assume that in all communities, the community with the
largest number of nodes has κ nodes, i.e. κ = max
ck
|Nck |.
There is |Nci | nodes in community ci, and the probability set
for community ci is shown below:
Pi = [pi(1), pi(2), · · · , pi(m), · · · , pi(κ), ] (4)
This setting makes all probability sets the same size, i.e. κ
elements. |Nci | is usually less than κ, and equals κ when ci is
the largest community. Thus, some element of Pi would equal
to zero when |Nci | < κ. The detail definition of the element
of Pi is given below:
pi(t) =

dt∑
t∈Nci
dt
t ≤ |Nci |
0 t > |Nci |
(5)
where dt is the degree of node t. More detail, each node
in community has one probability value, and the rest of
elements equal to zero to complete the probability set. Then,
the probability set Pi should be sorted in descending order,
and it is denoted as Pi′, which can be shown below:
Pi
′ = [pi′(1), pi′(2), · · · , pi′(t), · · · , pi′(κ), ] (6)
This is because the order of probability set would affect the
JSD between two probability set, and the descending order
can eliminate the error caused by the sequence.
Definition III.4. The Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) [31]
can measure the difference between probability distribution in
information theory. In this paper, JSD is applied to measure
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the difference between two community structure, which is
denoted as µij and defined as follows:
µij = DJS(Pi
′||Pj ′)
=
1
2
×
 κ′∑
t=1
pi
′(t) ln
pi
′(t)
pcon′(t)
+
κ′∑
t=1
pj
′(t) ln
pj
′(t)
pcon′(t)

(7)
where Pcon′ is obtained as follows:
Pcon
′ =
Pi
′ + Pj ′
2
(8)
Pi
′ and Pj ′ are two descending order probability sets for ci
and cj , pi′(t) and pj ′(t) are the elements in the probability set
which are obtained from Eq. (5). κ′ is the smaller one between
|Nci | and
∣∣Ncj ∣∣, i.e. κ′ = min{|Nci | , ∣∣Ncj ∣∣}. The chosen of
κ′ is to avoid pi′(t)/pcon′(t) or pj ′(t)/pcon′(t) being 0 or
infinity, thus outputting out-of-range logarithmic values.
Compared with relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, KLD), the JSD has the following difference:
• JSD is symmetrical, unlike KLD is asymmetrical, i.e.
DJS(Pi
′||Pj ′) = DJS(Pj ′||Pi′).
• The range of JSD is [0, 1], when two probability distri-
butions are the same, DJS equals to 0, and DJS = 1
means these two probability distributions are completely
different.
With the obtained JSD, log-sigmoid transition (LST) func-
tion which is also called S-type growth curve is used as
a transition function for the distance between communities.
Because of the monotonically increasing character and inverse
function, LST is wildly in information science.
Definition III.5. The AD υij obtained by LST function is
defined as follows:
υij =
1
1 + e−ϕ·µij
, i 6= j (9)
where µij is the JSD between communities, and ϕ is the fitting
parameter to adjust the performance of this model. i 6= j
means LST function would not change the AD of community
itself. With the change of ϕ, the AD between communities will
also change. The fitting parameter ϕ is chosen as 3 in this
model to achieve a better effect. The figure corresponding to
the function with ϕ = 3 is shown in Fig. 3.
Thus, the AD between any two communities can be obtained
to construct community network (CN), and the distance to
describe the difference of communities can be shown by υij .
Here one example is given to illustrate the algorithm.
Example III.3. With the obtained community structure from
Example III.1 for the social network shown in Fig. 1, c2
and c3 are chosen as example. The descending order of
probability set for c2 and c3 are P2′ = [ 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0] and
P3
′ = [ 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ] respectively. Then, Pcon
′ can be calculated
as Pcon′ = [ 724 ,
7
24 ,
7
24 ,
1
8 ].
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
JSD 7ij
-0.1
0
0.0474
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.9526
1
1.1
A
D
> i
j
>ij =
1
1 + e!3"7ij
Fig. 3. The log-sigmoid function expression with ϕ = 3.
Because |Nc2 | and |Nc3 | equal to 3 and 4 respectively, κ′
would be assigned 3. Then the JSD µ23 between c2 and c3 is
obtained below:
µ23 = µ32 =
1
2
× (3× 1
3
× ln 1/3
7/24
+ 3× 1
4
× ln 1/4
7/24
)
= 0.0090
The JSD µ23 would be transformed to AD υ23 with LST
function:
υ23 =
1
1 + e−3×0.0090
= 0.5067
and the AD matrix for this community structure is obtained
as follows:
υ =
 0 0.5126 0.53180.5126 0 0.5067
0.5318 0.5067 0

2) Community Large Scale Relationship: There are several
methods to measure the relationship between different each
pair of communities, here the gravity model (GM) [32] is
chosen as the algorithm to obtain the relationship. Based
on the obtained AD between each pair of communities, the
relationships between communities will be obtained by GM
in this part.
Definition III.6. Generally speaking, the community with a
large number of nodes would have lower vulnerability. Thus,
the gravity index (GI) of each community is obtained by GM,
and the details are shown below:
γi =
∑
cj∈C,cj 6=ci
|Nci | ×
∣∣Ncj ∣∣
υ2ij
(10)
where cj is all communities in the social network except
community ci, |Nci | and
∣∣Ncj ∣∣ are the number of nodes in
community ci and cj respectively, υij is the AD between ci
and cj which is obtained by JSD and LST.
Example III.4. In order to illustrate how GM describes the
relationship between communities, one example is given below.
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With the community division in Example III.1, the gravity index
of community c1 can be obtained as follows:
γ1 =
2× 3
0.51262
+
2× 4
0.53182
= 51.1223
and the result about GI for all communities are γ =
[51.1223, 69.5717, 72.0215].
D. Part IV: Vulnerability Evaluating and Ranking
1) Community Vulnerability Evaluating: With the obtained
EIC, EOC, and GI, the vulnerability of communities can be
evaluated and ranked to analyze their property. Because EIC
considers the interior information of each community, EOC
considers the interaction with neighboring communities which
belongs to small scale, and GI considers the relationship
between the chosen community and all other communities
which is a large scale for information consideration. Thus,
the adequate considerations of information enable better mea-
surement of community vulnerability.
Definition III.7. The proposed community vulnerability mea-
surement methodology is denoted as ζi, and defined as follows:
ζi=
1
(ηi)
α
(σi)
β
(γi)
χ
(11)
where ηi, σi, and γi are normalized EIC, EOC, and GI
respectively, which considers the information of communities
adequately. The reason for normalizing these factors is to
consider them at the same scale. In addition, α, β, and χ are
the weighting parameters for different factors, i.e. the different
information considerations.
The relative vulnerability ξi of community based on ζi is
defined as follows:
ξi =
ζi
min
t
ζt
(12)
Thus the relative vulnerability of each community can be
shown more detail.
The setting of these weighting parameters is to evaluate the
vulnerability in different situations, which can easily adjust the
weight for different information. These weighting parameters
make GBCVE more reasonable, and some special cases for ζi
are shown below:
1) α = β = χ: ζi would consider all factors equally.
2) β = 1, α = χ = 0: ζi would degenerate classical
community vulnerability method Vi [27]. In addition, ζi
only considers the interaction with neighboring community
in this situation.
3) χ = 0: ζi would consider the information in small scale, i.e.
the interior information of community and the interaction
with neighboring community.
4) α = β = 0: ζi would consider the information in large
scale, i.e. the relationship between chosen community and
all other communities.
Example III.5. To evaluate the vulnerability of each commu-
nity in Fig. 1, this proposed method ζi and classical measure
Vi are used in this example. The weighting factors α, β, and
χ equal to 1 in ζi to consider these information equally.
According to Eq. (11) and (12), the related information, the
vulnerability ζi and relative vulnerability ξi of each community
of the GBCVE model, and the result of classical measurement
Vx (vulnerability) and Rx (relative vulnerability) are shown
in Table II as follows:
TABLE II
THE VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNITIES IN THE EXAMPLE SOCIAL
NETWORK SHOWN IN FIG. 1.
Community ci ηi σi γi ζi ξi Vi [27] Ri [27]
c1 0.1667 0.5000 0.6814 17.6099 17.6099 2 2
c2 0.5000 0.5000 0.9217 4.3133 4.3133 2 2
c3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
From the result of Vi, the classical measure Vi can explain
c3 is the most stable, but it cannot distinguish the vulnerability
of c1 and c2. Thus, c1 and c2 are equally vulnerable (V1 = V2)
for Vi perspective. However, as can be seen from Fig. 1, c1 is
more vulnerable than c2, because there are more nodes in c2,
and c2 is a fully-connected community.
From the result of ζi, this proposed method ζi can clearly
distinguish the vulnerability of each community. There is a
clear order between their vulnerabilities (ζ1 > ζ2 > ζ3). Thus,
this means this proposed methodology is a more reasonable
and effective method to evaluate the vulnerability of each
community.
2) Community Vulnerability Fuzzy Ranking: To better com-
pare the property of each community using vulnerability, it is
possible to calculate the fuzzy ranking of each community.
Definition III.8. The fuzzy ranking order for community
vulnerability is shown below:
[cf(1)Ω1cf(2) · · · cf(|C|−1)Ω|C|−1cf(|C|)] (13)
where f(·): {1, 2, · · · , |C| − 1} → {1, 2, · · · , |C| − 1} is a
permutation function that ranks community relative vulnera-
bilities in the ascending order, i.e. ξf(t+1) ≥ ξf(t) for any
t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |C| − 1}. Ω1, · · · ,Ω|C|−1 is the corresponding
relationship between communities, which is the element of
{≈,≤, <,}. Inspired by [33], the corresponding relation-
ship transformation approach is defined below:
Ωt =

≈ ∆t < 0.25δ
≤ 0.25δ < ∆t < 0.75δ
< 0.75δ < ∆t < 1.5δ
 1.5δ < ∆t
(14)
where ∆t is the distinction between adjacent vulnerability, i.e.
∆t = ξf(t+1) − ξf(t). In addition, the δ is determined by the
average of distinction between adjacent vulnerability, which is
shown as follows,
δ =
1
|C| − 1
|C|−1∑
t=1
∆t =
1
|C| − 1
|C|−1∑
t=1
(
ξf(t+1) − ξf(t)
)
(15)
Thus the fuzzy ranking order of community vulnerability can
be obtained.
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Example III.6. The ξi in Example III.5 is used in this example
to show the fuzzy ranking of the example social network. The
δ can be obtained below:
δ =
1
3− 1 ((4.3113− 1) + (17.6099− 4.3113))
= 8.3050
Then, the corresponding relationship is determined as follows,
∆1 = 4.3113− 1 = 3.3113
∆2 = 17.6099− 4.3113 = 13.2986
Based on Eq. (14), the Ω1 and Ω2 would be ≤ and 
respectively, and the fuzzy ranking order of three communities
is [c3 ≤ c2  c1]. From the fuzzy ranking order, the
vulnerability of c3 and c2 are similar, but the vulnerability
of c1 is far greater than the other two VoC.
E. Part V: sensitivity Analysis
After the VoCs are obtained by GBCVE, the sensitivity
of this proposed method should be analyzed. Because these
three weighting parameters can change the result of VoCs
with different values, they are significant for VoCs. Thus, how
to determine these weighting parameters is still an important
issue for this model. In mathematical and physical models,
the input influences on the output variance can be analyzed
by global sensitivity analysis. In this paper, the Sobol’ indices
(SI) based on variance decomposition is used.
Definition III.9. The first-order Sobol’ index Si and total
effect index STi are detailed introduced below:
Si =
V arXi (EX∼i (Y |Xi))
V ar (Y )
STi =
EX∼i (V arXi (Y |X∼i))
V ar (Y )
(16)
where Xi is the ith independent factor of input X , X∼i is all
inputs except Xi, Y is the output of this model, and V ar (Y )
is the variance of Y with the change of input. Specifically, Si
can describe the contribution of Xi to Y . STi can describe
the contribution of the variability of Xi to the variance of Y ,
i.e. V ar (Y ). In addition, STi considers both individual input
effects and the interaction with other inputs.
IV. EVALUATIONS
In this section, two real world complex networks are used
to show the effectiveness and reasonability of this proposed
model, and they are Manzi network and Italian power network
respectively. Both of them are commonly used networks for
analyzing vulnerabilities, and they are more complex than the
previous example network.
A. Case I: Manzi Network
The telephone network in Belgium [34] is used in this
subsection to analyze these communities’ vulnerability. The
Manzi network structure is shown in Fig. 4, and there are lots
of nodes and edges in this network, which is more complex
Community 5 Community 7
Community 6
Community 4
Community 1
Community 3
Community 2
Fig. 4. The structure and community division of Manzi network.
than the example social network. The purpose of this model
is to evaluate and rank the vulnerability of each community.
The Manzi network is divided into several communities
by Newman modularity, and the detail community division
is shown in Fig. 4. Observed from Fig. 4, this network is
divided into seven communities, and the modularity Q equals
to 0.6316, which means the community structure is strong.
The specific nodes in each community can be also observed
in Fig. 4.
We first calculate the AD between each pair of communities
rather than the basic information of the community, because
the basic information can be easily obtained by the topological
structure in Fig. 4, which will be given directly in Table III.
According the definition as Eq. (7), it is clear to get the JSD
between communities, and the AD after LST for each pair
of communities can be obtained by Eq. (9) with ϕ = 3. The
AD describes the difference between communities, and it is
symmetrical which can describe the distance accurately. The
details of υ can be shown below:
υ=

0.0000 0.5027 0.5092 0.5284 0.5080 0.5196 0.5176
0.5027 0.0000 0.5088 0.5342 0.5042 0.5189 0.5172
0.5092 0.5088 0.0000 0.5514 0.5055 0.5057 0.5343
0.5284 0.5342 0.5514 0.0000 0.5445 0.5715 0.5067
0.5080 0.5042 0.5055 0.5445 0.0000 0.5124 0.5255
0.5196 0.5189 0.5057 0.5715 0.5124 0.0000 0.5532
0.5176 0.5172 0.5343 0.5067 0.5255 0.5532 0.0000

After the AD between communities is obtained, these
communities will construct a CN, and this CN with seven
communities for Manzi network can be shown in Fig. 5 as
follows:
It can be found that the CN is a fully-connected undirected
network, this is because the AD considers the relationship be-
tween each pair of community in the network. The relationship
in the CN is the existence of the edge.
Then, with the obtained AD and the number of nodes in
each community, the GI defined in Eq. (10) of each community
can be obtained as follows:
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Fig. 5. The community network of Manzi network.
γ=

1.1976× 103
1.2009× 103
1.6005× 103
4.9455× 102
1.3434× 103
1.8688× 103
6.8179× 102

The EIC and EOC can be obtained directly from the adja-
cency matrix of the network, and GI has been just obtained.
These factors are normalized first, then the vulnerability ζi
and relative vulnerability ξi can be obtained by the GBCVE
model through Eq. (11) and Eq. (12). It is worth noticing
that three weighting parameters α, β, χ are set to 1 here,
which is an equal consideration for all factors. The information
of communities, obtained ζi and ξi, the result of classical
measurement Vx and Rx, and the ranking result of this
proposed GBCVE model are shown in Table III.
TABLE III
THE RELATED INFORMATION AND VULNERABILITY RESULTS OF
SEVEN COMMUNITY IN MANZI NETWORK.
Community ηi σi γi ζi ξi Vi [27] Ri [27] Ranking
c1 0.4211 0.6667 0.6409 5.5590 3.7060 1.5000 1.5000 4
c2 0.3684 0.6667 0.6426 6.3358 4.2239 1.5000 1.5000 3
c3 0.5263 1.0000 0.8565 2.2184 1.4790 1.0000 1.0000 6
c4 0.1579 0.6667 0.2646 35.8975 23.9316 1.5000 1.5000 2
c5 0.4211 0.6667 0.7188 4.9559 3.3039 1.5000 1.5000 5
c6 1.0000 0.6667 1.0000 1.5000 1.0000 1.5000 1.5000 7
c7 0.2105 0.3333 0.3648 39.0586 26.0391 3.0000 3.0000 1
Observed from Table III, the relative vulnerability of each
community is ξ1 = 3.7060, ξ2 = 4.2239, ξ3 = 1.4790, ξ4 =
23.9316, ξ5 = 3.3039, ξ6 = 1, ξ7 = 26.0391. Based on Eq.
(15), δ can be calculated as 4.1732. Finally, the community
vulnerability fuzzy ranking order can be obtained by Eq. (14)
as: c6 ≈ c3 ≤ c5 ≈ c1 ≈ c2  c4 ≤ c7.
From ξi and Ri, it can be found that c7 is the most
vulnerable community recognized by two methods, because
there is only a ring of four nodes. Then Ri believes that c1, c2,
c4, c5, and c6 has the same vulnerability, but it is impossible
because of their different structure. This proposed method ξi
can give a specific ranking of these communities’ vulnerability.
c4 is the second most vulnerable (fully connected network with
three nodes). In addition, V oC7 and V oC4 are far greater than
other communities’ vulnerability from the fuzzy ranking result.
The vulnerability of c1, c2, and c5 are close (similar with Ri),
but there is a specific ranking, i.e. ξ5 < ξ1 < ξ2, which is
better than the classical method Ri. The V oC1, V oC2, and
V oC5 can be observed from the structure of each community
from Fig. 4. Another difference between ξi and Ri is the result
about c6 and c3. Ri thinks c6 is more vulnerable than c3, and
this proposed method ξi thinks c3 is more vulnerable than
c6 and their vulnerability is similar from the fuzzy ranking.
Observed from Fig. 4, there is only a ring in c3 and other
nodes are connected in a straight line, and c3 will have a high
probability of being split into two subgraphs after removing
a node; most of the nodes in c6 are connected in the form of
a ring, and it will rarely be divided into two subgraphs after
removing a node. Thus, it can be clearly seen that c3 is more
vulnerable than c6 from the structure of these communities.
Therefore, from the comparison of these two methods in
Manzi network, ξi can give a specific ranking result of each
community, and it can show how big the gap between V oCs
is from the fuzzy ranking. Thus this proposed model is a more
reasonable and effective method to evaluate the vulnerability
of each community in the social network.
TABLE IV
THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE V oCs WITH WEIGHTING
PARAMETERS α, β , AND χ.
Community Si(α) STi (α) Si(β) STi (β) Si(χ) STi (χ)
c1 0.4166 0.7287 0.1078 0.3099 0.1287 0.3669
c2 0.4431 0.7733 0.0911 0.2971 0.1078 0.3491
c3 0.9004 0.9410 0.0000 0.0000 0.0598 0.1007
c4 0.2035 0.8325 0.0156 0.2355 0.1272 0.7504
c5 0.4907 0.7632 0.1274 0.3254 0.0863 0.2463
c6 0.0000 0.0000 0.9991 0.9990 0.0000 0.0000
c7 0.1192 0.7722 0.0688 0.6419 0.0585 0.6374
Then, SI in Section III-E is used to analyze the sensitivity
of these weighting parameters. Different values of weighting
parameters can focus on different aspects of information of
community, and give different vulnerability results for net-
works. The sensitivity analysis results of VoCs with three
weighting parameters are shown in Table IV, and observed
from the results, some conclusions can be obtained below:
1) The value of Si can show the sensitivity of each weighting
parameter. For example, V oC1 is most sensitive to α,
followed by β, and χ is the least sensitive.
2) When the value of factor equals to 1, the Si and STi of
weighting parameter would equal to 0, like η6 = 1 cause
S6(α) = 0 ST6(α) = 0. This means that when the factor
equals to 1, the sensitivity of weighting parameters (index)
would not change and equal to 0.
3) Si(α) is larger than Si(β) and Si(χ), which means this
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method is more sensitive with α, i.e. EIC is more influential
to VoCs.
4) In most cases, the sum of Si over three weighting parame-
ters in each community is less than 1. This situation is due
to the interaction between these consideration parameters,
but this situation does not appear in STi .
5) Even if there is an interaction that makes Si and STi
different, it is interesting that Si and STi maintain the same
order between different information factors in the same
community. For example, in c1, S1(α) > S1(χ) > S1(β)
and ST1(α) > ST1(β) > ST1(χ).
B. Case II: Italian Network
Then, Wei [28] method is also used in this subsection
to prove the superiority of this proposed GBCVE model.
The Italian 380KV power transmission grid network [35], a
network often used for vulnerability analyzing, is used in this
subsection as the subject of the experiment. The structure
and the community division of Italian network are shown
in Fig. 6. This network is divided into 10 communities by
Newman’s modularity method and the modularity Q equals to
0.7596 which shows the strong community structure of Italian
network. The specific nodes of each community can be seen in
Fig. 6. Similarly, ϕ is set to 3 in the LST function to obtain AD
between communities, and α, β, χ are set to 1, which means
the same consideration of information.
Community 10
Community 8
Community 9
Community 7
Community 5
Community 3
Community 2
Community 4Community 1
Community 6
Fig. 6. The structure and community division of Italian network.
According to Section III, the related information and the
vulnerability of each community obtained by different methods
are shown in Table V. Furthermore, the fuzzy ranking result
of Italian network is c9 ≈ c5 ≈ c4 ≈ c2 ≈ c6 ≈ c1 ≈ c3 ≤
c8  c7  c10.
TABLE V
THE RELATED INFORMATION AND VULNERABILITY RESULTS OF TEN
COMMUNITY IN ITALIAN NETWORK.
Community ηi σi γi ζi ξi Vi [27] Ri [27] Vi′ [28] Ri′ [28] Ranking
c1 0.5161 0.3750 0.7061 7.3168 5.4876 2.6667 2.6667 9.1020 2.6547 5
c2 0.4194 0.6250 0.6117 6.2370 4.6778 1.6000 1.6000 5.0539 1.4741 7
c3 0.4839 0.3750 0.6551 8.4123 6.3092 2.6667 2.6667 6.9333 2.0222 4
c4 0.6129 0.6250 0.7792 3.3502 2.5126 1.6000 1.6000 5.6606 1.6510 8
c5 0.5806 1.0000 0.7404 2.3262 1.7447 1.0000 1.0000 4.0843 1.1912 9
c6 0.4194 0.6250 0.5617 6.7920 5.0940 1.6000 1.6000 3.4459 1.0050 6
c7 0.2258 0.3750 0.3006 39.2892 29.4669 2.6667 2.6667 3.4286 1.0000 2
c8 0.3871 0.3750 0.5634 12.2266 9.1699 2.6667 2.6667 8.5554 2.4953 3
c9 1.0000 0.7500 1.0000 1.3333 1.0000 1.3333 1.3333 9.5387 2.7821 10
c10 0.1935 0.1250 0.3567 115.8782 86.9087 8.0000 8.0000 39.2052 11.4347 1
It can be found that c10 is the most vulnerable community in
the network evaluated by three methods, which is the common
point of the three methods. Then, in order to compare the
performance of vulnerability rankings obtained by different
methods, the detailed ranking results are shown in Table VI.
TABLE VI
THE VULNERABILITY RANKING OF COMMUNITIES OBTAINED BY
DIFFERENT METHODS IN ITALIAN NETWORK.
Method Vulnerability Ranking
Classical method [27] R5 < R9 < R2 = R4 = R6 < R1 = R3 = R7 = R8 < R10
Wei et al. method [28] R7′ < R6′ < R5′ < R2′ < R4′ < R3′ < R8′ < R1′ < R9′ < R10′
Proposed method ξ9 < ξ5 < ξ4 < ξ2 < ξ6 < ξ1 < ξ3 < ξ8 < ξ7 < ξ10
Fuzzy ranking of proposed method c9 ≈ c5 ≈ c4 ≈ c2 ≈ c6 ≈ c1 ≈ c3 ≤ c8  c7  c10
Observed from Table VI, compared with the classical
method and this proposed method, Wei method gives a more
confusing result. Specifically, c9 is considered to be a less
vulnerable community by Ri (Rank 9) and ξi (Rank 10), but
in Wei method it is considered to be a highly vulnerable
community (Rank 2). In addition, c7 is a more vulnerable
community in Ri (Rank 3) and ξi (Rank 2), but a different
judgment in Ri′ (Rank 10). Therefore, Wei method is a
relatively confusing method, and the rest of ranking in Ri′
would not be analyzed.
Compared with classical method, this proposed method can
describe the change of VoCs more detail. For instance, Ri
gives equal vulnerability of c1, c3, c7, c8, and cannot distin-
guish the difference of their vulnerability, but this proposed
method can give a specific ranking of their vulnerability, i.e.
ξ1 < ξ3 < ξ8 < ξ7, and their fuzzy ranking c1 ≈ c3 ≤ c8 
c7. It can be found that this proposed method not only gives
a change in the vulnerability between these communities, but
also a specific description of the relationship between them,
i.e.  or ≤ or ≈. This is also suitable for other communities
whose vulnerability cannot be evaluated by classical method,
i.e. c2, c4, and c6.
Therefore, compared with classical method and Wei method,
this proposed GBCVE model can get vulnerability result of
communities more effectively. In addition, the result obtained
by GBCVE model is more reasonable which follows the rule
of structure.
V. CONCLUSION
The vulnerability measuring is definitely essential of com-
munity study of social networks. In most cases, the vulnerabil-
ity result of the community that takes into account more kinds
of factors is more credible. In this paper, a novel community
vulnerability evaluation model named GBCVE is proposed to
consider adequate factors of each community. In this proposed
method, these three factors are the number of edges inside
the community, the number of edges connected neighboring
communities, and the gravity index, which correspond to
interior information of the community, small scale interaction
relationship, and large scale interaction relationship. The first
two factors are the basic property of the network which are
easy to obtain from the topological structure, and the last one
factor (large scale interaction relationship) is the focus of this
proposed GBCVE model. The structure difference between
each pair of community is firstly measured by Jensen-Shannon
divergence. Then the difference is converted to abstract dis-
tance by the log-sigmoid transition function (ϕ = 3). The
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gravity index of each community would be obtained by the
gravity model lastly which shows the relationship between the
chosen community and all other communities. Furthermore,
the vulnerability degree of each community can be evaluated
by this proposed GBCVE model (weighting parameters equal
to 1 in general), and the specific vulnerability ranking is given
via fuzzy ranking technique. In some cases, this proposed
method can degenerate to classical evaluation method with
special setting of weighting parameters. In addition, the global
sensitivity of weighting parameters is analyzed by Sobol’
index.
As seen in Section IV, two real world complex networks
are used to show the effectiveness and reasonability of this
proposed model. For Manzi network, there are 7 communities
to evaluate their vulnerability. It is obvious that this proposed
model can better evaluate the vulnerability of each community,
because it can give different values of ξi when classical method
only judges the same vulnerability of these communities. In
addition, the fuzzy ranking of communities can show how
much the difference of vulnerability between them is. The
sensitivity analysis shows which factor is more influential to
the vulnerability result. For Italian network, compared with
the confusing result in Wei method, the vulnerability result of
this proposed model is more reasonable and objective.
Considering the important position of vulnerability evalu-
ating in the community study of social networks, we believe
that this proposed model can achieve more reasonable and
objective results in the community research. Specifically, it
is meaningfully to use the community vulnerability order
with the combination of other models, such as the com-
munity recovery and alliance partner looking. In addition,
other important factors to community properties in overlapping
community structure are also worth exploring, which is the
focus of our future research.
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